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Abstract 
The Adani Carmichael Coal Mine in the Galilee Basin of Queensland is 
one of the largest open cut coalmine proposals in the world. The 
development approval process for the mine has been deeply contentious, 
with opposition raised by environmental, farming and indigenous groups. 
Federal government approval of the mine has been successfully challenged 
in the Federal Court through judicial review. This led to a reconsideration 
and subsequent re-approval of the project, combined with the Federal 
Government proposing statutory changes to standing rules to restrict the 
capacity of civil society groups to bring judicial review actions. Given the 
broad standing provisions for judicial review that have been present in the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (Cth) (‘EPBC 
Act’) since its inception in 1999, what are the reasons behind this proposal 
for significant change in Australian environmental law? Drawing on 
phronetic legal enquiry methodology, this article provides a case study of 
the ways in which societal discourses intersect with law and political 
economy in shaping the ability of civil society to challenge the approval 
processes for major resource projects. This case study shows that the 
Federal Government’s agenda to reduce standing under the EPBC Act 
represents a decisive attempt to assert power and control by reducing the 
capacity of dissentients to oppose economic development. In doing so, this 
case study highlights the value of phronetic legal inquiry as methodology 
for analysing processes of change, and attempted change, in law. 
‘Whichever way you look at it, this little black rock provides 
many benefits to our economy, wages, infrastructure and 
everyday lifestyle. And it can now reduce its emissions by up 
to 40 per cent.’1 
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1 Coal. It’s an Amazing Thing.<littleblackrock.com.au>. 
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‘Coal fired power plants are the biggest source of man-made 
CO2 emissions. This makes coal energy the single greatest 
threat facing our climate.’2 
‘I may live nowhere near the Liverpool Plains or the Great 
Barrier Reef. But I sure as hell am concerned they are 
protected. ... The latest move by the Abbott government puts 
at risk not just our environment but our very democracy.’3 
Keywords 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Biographies are not infrequently the genesis of scholarship, for the 
personal, as Carol Hanisch famously wrote, is political.4 In this paper, the 
authors – both of whom are legal scholars, who have lived most of their 
lives in Newcastle – were drawn to the problem arising out of the recent 
(failed) attempt by the present Liberal Coalition government to pass law 
abolishing the right of third party standing to challenge development 
approvals in the context of large-scale coal mining. The intersection of 
coal, law and our identities as ‘Novocastrians’, inspired a curiosity to 
inquire as to why third party standing rules, legislated nearly twenty year 
earlier by a previous Liberal Coalition government, had now been 
problematised to such an extent that the executive had recently sought their 
repeal. What has happened that the liberal principle of ‘accountability of 
government’ has shifted into a discourse of ‘lawfare’? In the context of the 
relationship between the law and politics of climate change, these are 
critical questions. 
Our initial thoughts on this were necessarily personal and experiential. We 
were more than familiar with the common sights of coal ships and coal 
trains moving in and out of the city.5 We had lived in a region where a 
significant local economy relied on mining, in both open cut and 
                                                         
2 Greenpeace International, #Coal 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/climate-change/coal/>. 
3 Lisa Cox, ‘“Quite Simply Unbelievable’: Alan Jones Fronts Ad Campaign Opposing 
Abbott Government Plan’, Sydney Morning Herald (online) 7 September 2015 
<https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/quite-simply-unbelievable-alan-jones-fronts-ad-
campaign-opposing-abbott-government-plan-20150907-gjgkph.html>. 
4 Carol Hanisch, ‘The Personal is Political”’ in Shulie Firestone and Anne Koedt (eds), Notes 
from the Second Year: Women’s Liberation (Radical Feminism, 1970). 
5 Newcastle, New South Wales, is one of the largest coal exporting ports in the world. In any 
given year hundreds of ships move in and out of the port. The rail infrastructure of the Hunter 
Valley is crisscrossed with links to mine sites, with coal trains exceeding 100 carriages not 
uncommon. For an overview, see Port Authority of New South Wales, Newcastle Harbour, 
<https://www.portauthoritynsw.com.au/newcastle-harbour/>. 
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underground forms. We knew the towns around the Hunter Valley that 
were totally dependent on mining, and we had relatives and friends directly 
employed in mining, or one of its attendant industries. But we also knew 
that opinions on coal mining had changed over time,6 and that the open 
conflict over working conditions that used to characterise mining protest7 
had now shifted to more complex issues, including environmental 
concerns, greenhouse gas emissions,8 conflicts over land use between 
mining, farming, horse breeding and the wine industries,9 and the problem 
of high-profile corruption allegations involving corporate executives and 
state politicians.10 
As legal scholars, our initial focus of research came to a rapid conclusion. 
A ‘pure’, doctrinal (‘black letter’) analysis of the law could not answer 
wider questions as to why third party standing law needed to be repealed, 
or what the forces were that were shaping the debate. These were 
necessarily discursive rather than legal questions. From the position of 
doctrinal legal analysis, there was no apparent issue, as the rule structures 
governing standing are operative and well developed. It was clear that 
doctrinal analysis was not able to capture the range of issues existing 
outside of the rule structures, but necessarily shaping them. What was 
needed was an interdisciplinary approach, sensitive to the linkages between 
societal discourse, law and power. Drawing upon our recent work on 
                                                         
6 See eg Nick Higginbotham et al, ‘Environmental Injustice and Air Pollution in Coal 
Affected Communities, Hunter Valley, Australia’ (2010) 16(2) Health and Place 259; 
Editorial, ‘Land Use Conflicts on the Rise’, Newcastle Herald (online) 21 October 2014 
<http://www.theherald.com.au/story/2640012/editorial-land-use-conflicts-on-the-rise/>. 
7 Industrial action in the Hunter coalfields was common, particularly in the 1920s. The 
Rothbury Riot is still a part of local legend, with a memorial devoted to the riot and to 
Norman Brown – a striking coal miner killed by police in 1929 – located close to the scene 
of the Rothbury lockout. See Miriam Dixon, ‘Rothbury’ (1969) 17 Labour History 14; 
Richard Evans, ‘Murderous Coppers’ (2012) 9(1) History Australia 176; James Bennett, 
Nancy Cushing and Erik Eklund (eds), Radical Newcastle (NewSouth Books, 2015). 
8 Greenpeace and community activist group ‘Rising Tide’ have taken direct and legal action 
against the coal industry in Newcastle on several occasions. See Haughton v New South 
Wales [2011] NSWLEC 217; DPP v Fraser [2008] NSWSC 244; Alison Branley, ‘Rising 
Tide Activists Win’, Newcastle Herald (online) 3 March 2011 
<http://www.theherald.com.au/story/467306/rising-tide-activists-win/>; ABC News, Police 
Trying to Block Newcastle’s Oldest Port (28 March 2010) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-03-28/protesters-trying-to-block-newcastles-coal-
port/383074>. 
9 Michelle Harris, ‘Mining Hits Back at Thoroughbred Horse Breeding Industry’, Newcastle 
Herald (online) 9 April 2015 <http://www.theherald.com.au/story/3001540/mining-hits-
back-at-thoroughbed-horse-breeding-industry/>; Sophie Frazer, Maintaining Diversity in 
the Hunter Valley Landscape (24 October 2014) ABC Open 
<https://open.abc.net.au/explore/80774>. 
10 Operation Jasper, for example, saw adverse corruption findings made by the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption in NSW against a number of politicians in that state, 
including Mr Edward Obeid, and a number of business associates, including Mr Travers 
Duncan. See, eg, Duncan v Ipp [2013] NSWSC 314; Duncan v Ipp [2013] NSWCA 189; 
Duncan v New South Wales; NuCoal Resources Limited v New South Wales; Cascade Coal 
Pty Limited v New South Wales [2015] HCA 13; Obeid v Ipp [2016] NSWSC 1376. 
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sociolegal methodology, and our own doctoral work on the various ways 
in which discourse shapes law,11 we began by selecting a rich case study 
that would allow us to explore both the standing provisions of the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) 
(‘EPBC Act’), and the complex array of discourses intersecting with the 
law. Here we selected the proposed Adani Carmichael Coal Mine in 
Queensland as the exemplar, and decided to apply the phronetic approach 
to this case study. 
The proposed Adani Carmichael Coal Mine provides a recent and very 
sharp example of the kind of conflicts that now arise over coal mining in 
Australia. The proposed mine, located in the coal-rich Galilee Basin of 
Central Queensland, will be situated 160 km north-west of Clermont. 
When initially proposed, the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the 
project estimated the mine would involve a minimum AUD16.5 billion 
investment, with a lifespan of 60 years, and a capacity to produce more 
than AUD2 billion worth of coal annually, with production estimated at an 
average 60 million tonnes per annum.12 The area of the proposed mine is 
enormous, estimated at 44 000 hectares of land, including open-cut and 
underground mines, large waste dumps and tailing dams. The infrastructure 
requirements for the mine are extensive, including 189 kilometres of rail, 
most of which would be publicly financed.13 Following widespread public 
protest about the links between coal and climate change, and the cost to the 
public, in late 2018 Adani announced a major reduction in the intended 
scale of the operation to an AUD2 billion investment, wholly self-funded. 
The stated intention was to downsize the opening scale of the project, but 
then expand production over time.14 
The number of jobs the project will create is not clear. Initial estimates of 
the proponent suggested 10 000, but this was revised after complaints were 
                                                         
11 Brendon Murphy, Zone of Impeachment: A Post-Foucauldian Analysis of Controlled 
Operations Law and Policy (PhD Thesis, University of Newcastle, 2015); Jeffrey McGee, 
The Asia-Pacific Partnership and Contestation for the Future of the International Climate 
Regime (PhD thesis, Macquarie University, 2010).  
12 Department of State Development, Manufacturing, Infrastructure and Planning, 
Queensland Government, Environmental Impact Statement: Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail 
Project <https://www.statedevelopment.qld.gov.au/assessments-and-approvals/carmichael-
coal-environmental-impact-statement.html>. 
13 Full disclosure and commentary available at Adani Mining, Executive Summary (Report) 
<http://eisdocs.dsdip.qld.gov.au/Carmichael%20Coal%20Mine%20and%20Rail/EIS/EIS/P
roject%20Wide/executive-summary-project-wide.pdf>. 
14 Michael Slezak, Adani Says a Scaled-Down Version of its Carmichael Coal Mine Will Go 
Ahead; Environmentalists Express Scepticism (29 November 2018) ABC News 
<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-29/adani-carmichael-coal-mine-go-ahead-plans-to-
self-fund/10567848>; Mark Ludlow, ‘Adani Moves to Slash Costs to Get Carmichael Mine 
Across the Line’, Financial Review (online), 13 September 2018 
<https://www.afr.com/news/politics/adani-moves-to-slash-costs-to-get-carmichael-mine-
across-the-line-20180913-h15b2l>; EDO Queensland, Latest Adani Carmichael Mine and 
Rail Project News (27 September 2018) 
<https://www.edoqld.org.au/update_adani_mine_project>. 
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made to the Australian Securities Exchange that the figure was inflated.15 
The current EIS estimates 2 475 jobs during the construction phase and 3 
800 jobs during operation.16 It is estimated that by 2021, the mine will 
generate over AUD900 million in economic activity for the Mackay 
regional economy, and in excess of AUD2.9 billion for the wider 
Queensland economy.17 Despite the potential economic benefits, the mine 
proposal has been strongly opposed by a number of civil society groups, 
largely on environmental grounds. This opposition has taken several forms, 
including direct action, political lobbying and legal challenges. 
Consequently, the Adani project is a rich field for exploring the 
intersections between societal discourses and power. 
In this article, we examine some of the intersections between legal doctrine 
and policy in the field of environmental law, using the societal discourses 
surrounding the Adani Carmichael mine proposal as the exemplar. From 
the outset, it is important to emphasise that this article is not so much 
concerned with the Adani project, as with the complex ways in which 
discourses shape law and public policy and the deployment of a 
methodology adapted to that application. We begin by setting out 
components of the methodology employed in this case. Our methodology 
draws on the work of the founder of phronetic research in the social 
sciences, Bent Flyvbjerg18, and our own extension of this approach to legal 
research.19 In doing so, we explain some of the core aspects of phronetic 
legal research and its application in this example. We then turn to the 
doctrinal law operating in this case, namely the standing provisions in s 
487 of the EPBC Act, and its associated relationship with the 
                                                         
15 Jorge Branco, ‘Adani Carmichael Mine to Create 1464 Jobs not 10 000’, Brisbane Times 
(online), 28 April 2015 <http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/adani-carmichael-
mine-to-create-1464-jobs-not-10000-20150428-1mumbg.html>; Lucy Cormack and Lisa 
Cox, ‘Complaint Lodged with ASX Over Adani Job Claims for Carmichael Mine’, Sydney 
Morning Herald (online), 13 May 2015 <http://www.smh.com.au/business/mining-and-
resources/complaint-lodged-with-asx-over-adani-job-claims-for-carmichael-mine-
20150513-gh0tbl.html>; Rod Campbell, ‘Fact Check: Will Adani’s Coal Mine Really Boost 
Employment by 10 000 Jobs?’, Business Spectator (online), 31 August 2015 
<http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2015/8/31/policy-politics/fact-check-will-
adanis-coal-mine-really-boost-employment-10000>. 
16 Coordinator General, Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, 
Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail project: Coordinator-General’s Evaluation Report on the 
Environmental Impact Statement (Report, May 2014) 205. 
17 Ibid x. 
18 Bent Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can 
Succeed Again, tr Steven Sampson (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils 
Bruzelius and Werner Rothengatter, Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003); Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-
Study Research’ (2006) 12(2) Qualitative Inquiry 219; Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Case Study’ in 
Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (eds), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research 
(SAGE, 4th ed, 2011) 301; Bent Flyvbjerg, Todd Landman and Sanford Schram (eds), Real 
Social Science: Applied Phronesis (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
19 Brendon Murphy and Jeffrey McGee, ‘Phronetic Legal Inquiry: An Effective Design for 
Law and Society Research?’ (2015) 24(2) Griffith Law Review 288. 
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Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).  In part three, 
we then analyse the discourses linked to the Adani Carmichael mine 
proposal and how this is manifest in wider law and policy debates over 
reform of the law on standing under s 487 of the EPBC Act. Drawing on 
discourse theory,20 we identify the main features of the contesting policy 
discourses surrounding efforts to repeal the extended standing provision of 
s 487. Finally, in part four, in drawing on the rich empirics of the s 487 
reform debate, we discuss how phronetic legal enquiry offers a 
methodology that extends our understanding of the relationship between 
legalities and their underlying policy and political economy in ways that 
traditional doctrinal legal analysis cannot. 
A The Adani Carmichael Coal Mine Exemplar 
In Australian law, approvals for new coal mining projects are primarily in 
the hands of the relevant state government under state environmental, 
planning and pollution legislation.21 This is the case even when land is 
privately owned. However, if a proposed mine will likely have an impact 
upon a matter of ‘national environmental significance’,22 it will also trigger 
operation of the EPBC Act and must receive approval from the 
Commonwealth Minister for the Environment.23 Because the Adani 
Carmichael mine project will likely have an impact on several matters of 
national environmental significance, it required approvals from both the 
Commonwealth and Queensland governments. In addition to the 
significant infrastructure investment outlined above, the Adani Carmichael 
mine proposal included an application for a Queensland water licence to 
draw 12.5 gigalitres of water per year from the Belyando River, together 
with stated intent to also draw on subterranean water.24 The impact on 
water is likely to be very significant. Adani’s own estimate indicated a 
reduction in the water table at the open cut mine site ‘in excess of 300 
[metres]’, with groundwater reduction in surrounding areas ranging 
between one and four metres.25 Water resources impacted by large coal 
mining developments are listed as a ‘matter of national environmental 
significance’.26 The proposed mine site was also identified as straddling 
koala and echidna habitat, as well as being the location of several 
                                                         
20 John Dryzek, Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
21 In Queensland, this is determined pursuant to the Environmental Protection Act 1994 
(Qld).  
22 EPBC Act ch 2 pt 3. 
23 EPBC Act ch 2. 
24 Adani Mining, Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail Project: Supplementary Environmental 
Impact Statement Volume 4, Appendix C4e – Application to Take Water from the Belyando 
River (Environmental Impact Statement). 
25 Adani Mining, Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail Project: Report for Mine Hydrogeology 
(Report, 13 November 2013) 102. 
26 EPBC Act s 24D. 
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endangered animal and plant species. Federally listed protected species are 
also matters of national environmental significance under the EPBC Act.27 
In addition to these issues, concerns were raised about the contribution that 
coal from the mine will make (when used) to anthropogenic climate change 
over the 60-year life of the mine.28 Carbon dioxide from coal combustion 
will remain in the atmosphere for hundreds of years, so will contribute to 
global warming for a period well beyond the mine’s production life. 
Finally, concerns were raised by the Wangan and Jagalingou indigenous 
peoples that the mine would ‘devastate their ancestral lands and waters, 
totemic animals and plants, and cultural heritage’.29 
It is therefore no surprise that the Adani Carmichael mine proposal has 
been the subject of several legal challenges. The mine proposal has been 
before the Native Title Tribunal on multiple occasions.30 Those 
applications have so far been unsuccessful, but have escalated to the 
Federal Court,31 and may proceed to the High Court in due course. The 
mine proposal was subject to a judicial review application in the Federal 
Court by the Queensland Environmental Defenders Office (QEDO) in 
2015. In the end, consent orders were made on 4 August 2015 that EPBC 
Act approval for the Adani Carmichael coal mine had been made in error, 
due to a failure on the part of the then Minister for Environment (The Hon 
Gregory Hunt) to properly consider material relating to the impact of the 
proposed mine on endangered species.32 It was accepted by the 
Commonwealth that in making a decision to approve the mine, Minister 
Hunt had failed to consider information in possession of the 
Commonwealth relating to likely impacts upon two species of fauna, the 
                                                         
27 EPBA Act ch 2 pt 3 sub-div C. 
28 Figures vary, depending on the intensity of the burn and the concentration of carbon in 
coal deposits. The Energy Information Administration (US) estimates that 1 tonne of coal 
will produce, on average, 2.8 tonnes of CO2. If the expected volume of coal from the mine 
is two billion tonnes, this when burnt would equate to at least 5.6 billion tonnes (i.e. six 
gigatonnes) of carbon dioxide equivalent. See B D Hong and E R Slatick, Carbon Dioxide 
Emission Factors for Coal (1994) US Energy Information Administration 
<https://www.eia.gov/coal/production/quarterly/co2_article/co2.html>. 
29 Lisa Cox, ‘Native Title Battle Shaping Up Over Adani Coal Mine’ Sydney Morning Herald 
(online) 26 March 2015 <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/native-
title-battle-shaping-up-over-adani-coal-mine-20150326-1m8esn.html>. 
30 Adani Mining Pty Ltd v Burragubba [2015] NNTTA 16; Adani Mining Pty Ltd and Diver 
and Queensland [2013] NNTTA 52; Adani Mining Pty Ltd and Diver and Queensland 
[2013] NNTTA 30; Burragubba v Queensland [2016] FCA 984. 
31 Kempii v Queensland [2017] FCA 902; Kempii v Adani Mining Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 105; 
Kempii v Adani Mining Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 1086; Kempii v Adani Mining Pty Ltd 
(No 3) [2018] FCA 40; Kempii v Adani Mining Pty Ltd (No 4) [2018] FCA 1245;  Miller v 
Queensland [2016] FCA 271; Lampton v Queensland [2014] FCA 736; Burragubba v 
Queensland [2016] FCA 1525; Juru Enterprises Ltd v Adani Australia Company Pty Ltd 
[2018] FCA 870; Burragubba v Queensland [2017] FCA 373. 
32 Mackay Conservation Group v Commonwealth (Federal Court of Australia,  
NSD33/2015). 
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yakka skink and the ornamental snake.33 The result was the EPBC Act 
approval was overturned. The result of these Federal Court judicial review 
proceedings was publicly criticised by Northern Queensland conservative 
Federal MP, the Hon George Christensen, who called for the Federal 
Environment Minister to expedite a reconsideration of the Adani 
Carmichael mine proposal.34 On 15 October 2015, Federal Ministerial 
approval for the mine was provided addressing these concerns.35 This 
decision was also the subject of a further judicial review application in the 
Federal Court by the Australian Conservation Foundation (‘ACF’), for an 
alleged failure by the Minister to consider the impact of the mine on driving 
climate change and thereby causing damage (such as coral bleaching) to 
the world heritage listed Great Barrier Reef.36 A key aspect of this case was 
the ‘water trigger’ impact provisions arising under s 527E of the EPBC 
Act. The case itself is significant, because of the detailed way in which the 
court was asked to consider evidence of climate change as part of the 
proceedings. In the end, the application for judicial review was dismissed37 
and the ACF was required to pay a substantial costs order.38 
B An Agenda to Restrict Third Party Standing 
In the wake of these proceedings, the federal government publicly 
criticised the capacity of ‘green groups’ to oppose large-scale 
developments in the courts, describing the ‘tactic’ of legal opposition by 
‘radical green groups’ as ‘vigilante litigation’39 and ‘lawfare’.40 The federal 
government also proposed legislative change to restrict the standing of 
members of the public to bring similar judicial review proceedings in 
                                                         
33 Approval of Adani’s $16 Billion Carmichael Mine in Queensland’s Galilee Basin Set Aside 
by Federal Court (6 August 2015) ABC News <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-
05/federal-court-overturns-approval-of-adani's-carmichael-coal-mine/6673734>; Primrose 
Riordan, ‘Federal Court Intervenes Over Adani “Lawfare”’ Financial Review (online) 9 
August 2015 <http://www.afr.com/news/federal-court-intervenes-over-adani-lawfare-
20150819-gj2w2q>. 
34 ‘Adani Mine Decision: Federal Court Ruling Shifts Environmental Approval Goal Post, 
MP Says’ (7 August 2015) ABC News <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-06/adani-
decision-court-shifted-goal-posts-christensen/6676450>. 
35  Minister for the Environment, Greg Hunt MP, ‘Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail 
Infrastructure Project’ (Media Release, 15 October 2015) 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/minister/hunt/2015/pubs/mr20151015.pdf>. 
36 Jessica von Vonderen, ‘Australian Conservation Foundation challenges Adani Carmichael 
Coal Mine in Federal Court’ (9 November 2015) ABC News 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-09/adani-mine-australian-conservation-foundation-
court-challenge/6923598>. 
37 Australian Conservation Foundation v Minister for the Environment [2016] FCA 1042. It 
is worth noting that standing was not an issue in this case. 
38 Australian Conservation Foundation v Minister for the Environment (No 2) [2016] FCA 
1095. 
39 Attorney-General, George Brandis MP, ‘Government Acts to Protect Jobs from Vigilante 
Litigants’ (Media Release, 18 August 2015) 
<https://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Mediareleases/Pages/2015/ThirdQuarter/18-August-
2015-Government-acts-to-protect-jobs-from-vigilante-litigants.aspx>. 
40 Riordan, above n 33. 
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federal courts. Then Attorney-General, the Hon George Brandis, released 
a press statement on 18 August 2015, stating: 
The government has decided to protect Australian jobs by removing from 
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(EPBC Act) the provision that allows radical green activists to engage in 
vigilante litigation to stop important economic projects. …Section 487 of 
the EPBC Act provides a red carpet for radical activists who have a 
political, but not a legal interest, in a development to use aggressive 
litigation tactics to disrupt and sabotage important projects. … The 
activists themselves have declared that that is their objective – to use the 
courts not for the proper purpose of resolving a dispute between citizens, 
but for a collateral political purpose of bringing developments to a 
standstill, and sacrificing the jobs of tens of thousands of Australians in 
the process… (emphasis added). 41 
The government wasted no time in introducing to Parliament the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment 
(Standing) Bill (‘the repeal Bill’), which had the sole purpose of repealing 
s 487 of the EPBC Act.42 The repeal Bill was referred to the federal Senate 
for consideration and approval on 14 September 2015.43 It was 
subsequently referred to the Senate Environment and Communications 
Legislation Committee and public submissions invited on its merits and 
substance. The repeal Bill remained in Committee through the remainder 
of 2015, but eventually lapsed in April 2016, when Parliament was 
prorogued.44 
However, the agenda motivating the repeal Bill’s introduction has not 
disappeared in the wake of this prorogation of Parliament. In October 2016, 
the then Prime Minister, the Hon Malcolm Turnbull, indicated that the 
proposed changes to the EPBC remained government policy. However, the 
policies linked to it have expanded and transformed to include a review of 
the funding mechanisms which civil society groups use for legal 
challenges. Changes to the EPBC Act have therefore morphed to include 
notions of amendments to taxation and charity laws that would remove or 
restrict the tax-exempt status of some NGOs involved in climate 
litigation.45 The result is a distinction the federal government wishes to 
                                                         
41 Brandis, above n 39. 
42 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 20 August 2015, 8987 
(Hunt). 
43 Commonwealth of Australian, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 14 September 2015, 65 
(Ryan). 
44 Sophie Power and Juli Tomaras, Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Amendment (Standing) Bill 2015, No 37 of 2015-16, 3 November 2015; Parliament of 
Australia, Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment (Standing) 
Bill 2015 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_LEGislation/Bills_Search_Results/
Result?bId=r5522>. 
45 Dennis Shanahan, ‘Turnbull Moves to Shut Court Doors on Anti-Coal Activists’, The 
Australian, 25 October 2016, 6; Dennis Shanahan, ‘Activists Must Come Clean on Foreign 
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make between ‘legitimate conservation’ work and the ‘political activism’ 
of NGOs.46 It appears that the repeal of s 487 forms part of a larger federal 
government agenda aimed at limiting, or preventing, the capacity of 
environmental groups problematised as ‘vigilante’ to challenge major 
resource development projects by removing their statutory standing and the 
financial resources needed for large-scale litigation. 
By proposing to repeal s 487, the federal government is seeking to make a 
major alteration in the character of Australian environmental and 
administrative law to seriously restrict the capacity of the public and civil 
society to challenge the legality of decisions made about developments. 
This represents a significant retreat from the widening of standing that had 
been characteristic of Australian administrative and environmental law 
since the late 1970s. In an attempt to understand the political economy of 
this example, and its associated legal character, we deployed phronetic 
legal research as our methodology. 
II PHRONETIC LEGAL RESEARCH 
Recently, the authors articulated a methodology for socio-legal research 
we termed legal phronesis.47 This method is an adaptation of Flyvbjerg’s 
case-study model, published in Making Social Science Matter.48 Legal 
phronesis is an adaptation of this methodology, in that we advocate for the 
retention of the core doctrinal analytic which is the essential component of 
legal research method, but extend that research focus beyond the 
boundaries of legal rules (as contained in legislation, cases and treaties) to 
interrogate empirical elements relating to the formation, change in, and 
effects of law that are external to its doctrinal aspects. This approach to law 
and society research deploys a constructionist epistemology to inform a 
legal phronetic methodology. This methodology informs a doctrinal and 
discourse analysis technique, ultimately based on a case study and 
documentary analysis as its core research and analytical practice.49 The 
result is a theoretical framework sensitive to the technical, epistemic and 
normative components of law, as well as its sociological dimensions, and 
particularly the power dynamics present in the phenomena being 
examined. 
This is a research design necessarily interested in case study, particularly 
of unusual or significant events. The current push to repeal third party 
standing provisions is unusual, as there is no significant evidence in the 
                                                         
Funds’, The Australian, 26 October 2016, 5; Kerri-Anne Mesner, ‘PM Says ‘Lawfare’ 
Legislation Back on the Agenda”, The Morning Bulletin (Rockhampton, Australia), 28 
October 2016, 7. 
46 ‘Donation Rethink for Green Activist Groups’, Courier Mail (Brisbane), 12 April 2017, 
14. 
47 Murphy and McGee, above n 19. 
48 Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter, above n 18. 
49 Michael Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research (Allen and Unwin, 1998) 2-5. 
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doctrinal legal literature that justifies repeal of s 487. This approach offers 
a deeper understanding of the subject than traditional legal scholarship, 
because it sensitises the analysis to the driving power dynamics outside the 
rule structures. The federal government reform agenda to repeal s 487 is an 
unusual event, given the substantial public support for government 
accountability and expanded standing rules, and (as discussed later) the 
undoubted economic bias of the public submissions in favour of its repeal. 
To understand this case study, legal scholarship must go beyond the 
doctrinal logics of the legislation and previous court decisions50 and engage 
with the wider societal processes driving the reform agenda, hence our use 
of Flyvbjerg. 
There are, of course, many ways of tackling a subject of this kind. The very 
word ‘discourse’ invites a multitude of problems and methods. At the very 
least, the central problem is there are different theories as to what 
‘discourse’ means: in effect, there is now something of a ‘discourse of 
discourse’. These theories often overlap and/or draw from one another. For 
example, Foucault certainly popularised the term, but his approach to 
discourse analysis is complex and totalising in the sense that knowledge 
systems, discourse and power are inseparable and largely governed by an 
overarching ‘episteme’ that shapes social understanding of an issue in a 
given historical period.51 Habermas also uses the concept of discourse in 
his writing, but his focus draws on the linguistic philosophy of Searle and 
Austin to propose a normative model for the public sphere based on the 
rational exchange of ideas.52 More recently, Dryzek also uses discourse 
analysis, although his work is more concerned with charting the 
argumentative process of contestation between discourses which shapes 
social understanding of policy fields.53 
Why, then, did we deploy something else? The answer lies in the 
distinction between technique and framework for interpretation. Our 
purpose was to adopt a model that simply allowed us to identify, 
systematically, the core themes of contestation relevant to a discussion on 
law and policy. Our purpose was not to engage in detailed structural 
analysis of the rationalities themselves. That potential remains, but it is 
properly beyond the scope of this paper. 
                                                         
50 For a scholarly, but otherwise traditional, legal analysis of s 487 and judicial review, see 
Matthew Groves, ‘The Evolution and Reform of Standing in Australian Administrative Law’ 
(2016) 44 Federal Law Review 167. 
51 See, eg, Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (Alan Sheridan Smith trans, 
Routledge, 2003)  [trans of: L'Archeologie Du Savoir (first pubished 1972)]; Michel 
Foucault, ‘Questions of Method’ in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), 
The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) 73-86. 
52 Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Polity Press, 1996). For a general overview, 
see Stephen White (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Habermas (Cambridge University 
Press, 1995). 
53 Dryzek, above n 20. 
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Phronetic methodology54 is guided by four key questions directed at 
descriptive, analytical and normative concerns: 
1) Where are we going within the field of enquiry? 
2) Who gains, and who loses, by which mechanisms of power? 
3) Is it desirable? 
4) What should be done?55 
There is a merger in this methodology between techniques, assumptions, 
and underlying theoretical foundations, notably of Habermas and 
Foucault.56 Central to this methodology is the sensitive place of values and 
power in the research. These are regarded as critical aspects of phronetic 
inquiry because they are often overlooked in social science and legal 
research, but are fundamental components of social life and institutional 
relations.57 
Both of these concepts require further elaboration. Broadly, the idea of 
values is located within ethical philosophy, psychology and sociology, and 
is essentially concerned with desire, the perception of right, and an 
associated willingness to act to promote or defend the subject of the 
value.58 In some instances, value-laden decisions direct action, even when 
those actions defy logic, norms or the interests of the actor. Weber suggests 
that human social action is often ‘determined by a conscious belief in the 
value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of 
behaviour, independent on its prospects of success’.59 However, Weber 
also argues that value-based decisions can be not only intellectually driven 
by the promotion of certain values, but affective and emotionally driven, as 
well as habitual. In this way, values may impact on decision-making in 
ways that service the intellectual, unconscious and social position of the 
actor. And because values can be so strong on some topics, they can result 
in an affective rather than purely rational decision. The semantic meaning 
of ‘value’ attests to a social and psychological attachment of the 
desirability and qualitative evaluation of the object. A focus on values is 
necessarily connected to what an actor regards as worthwhile, desirable 
                                                         
54 Broadly, Flyvbjerg articulated nine principles in phronetic analysis: (1) Pay attention to 
values; (2) Locate power at the heart of the research; (3) Immersion in reality and primary 
sources; (4) Pay attention to local detail through thick description; (5) Movement between 
practice and discourse; (6) Isolation of cases in context; (7) Mobilise ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions; (8) Identifying specific actors and institutions; (9) Identify and engage with the 
polyphony of voices. See Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter, above n 18, 129. 
55 Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter, above n 18. 
56 Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Habermas and Foucault: Thinkers for Civil Society?’ (1998) 49(2) British 
Journal of Sociology 210; Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter, above n 18. 
57 Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter, above n 18. 
58 Shalom H Schwartz, ‘Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical 
Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries’ (1992) 25 Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology 1. 
59 Max Weber, Economy and Society, tr Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich (University of 
California Press, 1978) vol 1, 24-5. 
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and, fundamentally, necessary to protect and promote. Kant would argue 
that this combination of intellectual, affective and social value forms the 
foundation of a moral ‘imperative’ that must not only be protected, but 
promoted, if not insisted upon.60 Values are complicated by personal, social 
and contextual factors, and although they are fundamentally concerned 
with what we feel and believe is important, it has been recognised that 
values tend to be conceptually ordered in a hierarchy, further complicated 
by the fact that some values are concrete, while others are ephemeral, and 
others change over time.61 Ultimately, Flyvbjerg suggests that values can 
be identified based on what the actor is promoting or defending as an 
‘ought’, normative claim of right, or correction action. 
Flyvbjerg also emphasises the role of power in analysis. The centralisation 
of power offers a major focus of enquiry in both the ‘realist’ tradition in 
the social sciences62 and in the critical tradition of legal research and the 
practice of law itself.63 Lawyers tend to think about power in terms of the 
coercive power of the state. However, drawing on Habermas and Foucault, 
Flyvbjerg advocates a broader and more nuanced understanding of power. 
This conceptualises power beyond the law and state, inviting attention to 
the operation and circulation of power through and within organisations, 
individuals, institutions, and knowledge systems. Given the importance of 
power to the current analysis, it is worth setting out Flyvbjerg’s synthesis 
of power in detail: 
(1) Power is…productive and positive and not only…restrictive and 
negative. 
(2) Power is viewed as a dense net of omnipresent relations and not only 
as localised in ‘centres’ and institutions, or as an entity one can ‘possess’. 
(3) [P]ower is…ultradynamic; [it] is not only something one 
appropriates, but also something one reappropriates and exercises in a 
constant back-and-forth movement in relations of strength, tactics and 
strategies. 
(4) Knowledge and power, truth and power, rationality and power are 
analytically inseparable from each other; power produces knowledge, and 
knowledge produces power. 
(5) The central question is how power is exercised, and not only who has 
power, and why they have it; the focus is on process in addition to 
structure. 
(6) Power is studied with a point of departure in small questions, ‘flat and 
empirical’, not only…in ‘big questions’.64 
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This sensitisation of the research to the central role of values and power in 
the empirical case being examined are major components and strengths of 
Flyvbjerg’s phronetic approach. 
Indeed, we suggest that legal phronesis locates the primary focus of the 
study on the legalities within the case, rather than being part of the general 
context of phronetic social inquiry. Our position is to begin with legal 
doctrinal analysis, before moving into the social context of the doctrine (i.e. 
its formation, change and effects) giving emphasis to values, power and 
discourse. Fundamentally, we believe this approach has the potential to 
situate research of this kind at the intersection between law and social 
inquiry,65 opening insights in both directions that may otherwise not have 
been apparent. With this in mind, we now turn to doctrinal history of s 487. 
III STANDING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
‘Standing’ is the legal recognition of a person to bring action in a court of 
law. It is a concept derived from the Latin locus standi, which literally 
refers to a place to stand on, or in, but it has come to refer to the recognition 
of the rights of a person to lawfully bring an action before a court to enforce 
the law.66 The legal test for standing at common law relates to the nexus 
between the person and the cause of action, with standing arising only 
where the person has some direct interest in law affected by the respondent. 
Such rules generally exclude others from bringing an action to enforce the 
law, in the absence of some exception, such as reliance on a prerogative 
writ (such as habeas corpus), a ‘special interest’, or statutory right.67 
The common law legal rules relating to standing are complex, and tend to 
be shaped by the field of law that they occupy. While almost exclusively 
limited to the specific affected party in the context of private law 
(especially tort and contract), there are signs that the scope of standing is 
generally widening, a trend which has been the subject of explicit academic 
commentary,68 as well as Law Reform recommendation.69 The High Court 
                                                         
65 There is a distinction to be made between ‘social science’ and ‘social inquiry’. Social 
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has also signalled a more general willingness to extend the categories of 
special interest standing in appropriate cases.70 This expansion is, however, 
conservative, and necessarily enmeshed with questions of public policy, 
the available remedy, and the capacities of the plaintiff in the particular 
context. It is fair to say that while the law of standing is primarily a limiting 
provision, and does have the effect of causing delay, it is not a ‘loophole’ 
that invites litigation by any party. Indeed, the outcome in most cases is 
closer scrutiny of government decision making, accountability of the 
executive, and tighter controls over the project. Arguably, even where the 
challenge to development ‘fails’, the result is a better outcome because of 
the scrutiny involved. 
Standing in the context of environmental law has always presented 
something of a quandary. The general principle is that standing is narrowly 
construed to restrict the class of plaintiffs. For environmental cases, this 
essentially means that only those actors with a special interest, in the sense 
of being directly linked to the particular dispute, have standing at common 
law. The potential difficulty for environmental cases is that the class of 
affected individuals is extending in the face of large-scale developments, 
and particularly in the face of global scale environmental concerns, such as 
climate change. 
This dilemma is illustrated by Gibbs J in Australian Conservation 
Foundation v Commonwealth,71 when he comments: 
I would not deny that a person might have a special interest in the 
preservation of a particular environment. However, an interest, for 
present purposes, does not mean a mere intellectual or emotional concern. 
A person is not interested within the meaning of the rule, unless he is 
likely to gain some advantage, other than the satisfaction of righting a 
wrong, upholding a principle or winning a contest, if his action succeeds 
or to suffer some disadvantage, other than a sense of grievance or a debt 
for costs, if his action fails. A belief, however strongly felt, that the law 
generally, or a particular law, should be observed, or that conduct of a 
particular kind should be prevented, does not suffice to give its possessor 
locus standi. If that were not so, the rule requiring special interest would 
                                                         
70 Australian Conservation Foundation v Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493; Onus v Alcoa 
(1981) 36 ALR 425; Truth About Motorways v Macquarie (2000) 200 CLR 591. 
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be meaningless. Any plaintiff who felt strongly enough to bring an action 
could maintain it.72 
The result of this general principle is that standing is generally restricted to 
those whose rights, interests or legitimate expectations have been 
compromised, typically in the form of loss, although there is recognition 
that in some cases this category may be broad if falling within the ‘zone of 
interests’.73 This is a recognition that standing can arise in ‘special’ cases 
where the plaintiff has a personal interest in the case, but is not otherwise 
directly affected by the factual matrix. Characterising what ‘special 
interests’ are in this context is difficult. Since the ACF case was decided, 
the Federal Court has considered a range of factors that may constitute the 
‘special interests’ necessary to provide standing, including the size of the 
organisation, the cause, governmental recognition of the organisation in 
question, and the capacity in and integrity with which the organisation 
represents the public interest.74 The High Court in Argos v Corbell held 
that the ‘special interest’ necessary to extend standing was to be 
determined, on a case by case basis, and not interpreted narrowly: 
The focus of the inquiry required by the words is upon the connection 
between the decision and interests of the person who claims to be 
aggrieved. The interests that may be adversely affected by a decision may 
take any of a variety of forms. They include, but are not confined to, legal 
rights, privileges, permissions or interests. And the central notion 
conveyed by the words is that the person claiming to be aggrieved can 
show that the decision will have an effect on his or her interests which is 
different from (‘beyond’) its effect on the public at large.75 
Simply stated, the common law establishes two categories of standing: (i) 
those with a direct interest, and (ii) those purporting to act in the public 
interest. Similarly, leading commentators on legal standing, such as Cane76 
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and Edgar,77 describe the first approach as a ‘private interest model’ of 
standing, which responds to protect private interests in property and 
person. Cane and Edgar describe the second category as an ‘enforcement 
model’ of standing which, consistent with rule of law concerns, seeks to 
empower citizens and other societal actors to ensure that the executive acts 
only in accordance with legitimate power under public law.78 It is the latter 
category of ‘enforcement model’ of standing where much of the contention 
over the limits of standing lies. This creates problems for some 
environmental disputes, where the key issue is one of large-scale or public 
concern, with the result that a good deal of legal argument and energy can 
be directed to arguments over standing. The simplest solution, recognised 
in the ACF decision, is that the common law position on standing be 
extended by legislation.79 
The Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) has previously 
recommended a regime of circumscribed open standing heavily influenced 
by the enforcement model of standing. In 1996, the ALRC considered 
reform to the rules relating to standing to initiate proceedings in public law 
cases.80 The Commission recommended that the ‘special interest’ approach 
to standing from ACF be replaced by legislated open standing for public 
law cases, unless there was contrary legislative intent present, or such 
standing would provide unreasonable interference with private interests.81 
This open standing approach dispensed with the need for a plaintiff in 
judicial review proceedings to prove a private interest adversely affected 
by the decision under challenge. The Howard (Coalition) government 
failed to act on these recommendations, however.82 Whilst the ALRC 
recommended a path of open standing, there was significant concern that 
the exception to guard against unreasonable interference with private 
interests might unwittingly make it more difficult for environmental groups 
to bring public interest actions than under the common law standing rules 
of ACF. 
However, three years later a significant reform of the common law standing 
rules did occur with the Howard government’s passing of s 487 in the 1999 
EPBC Act. This section extended the meaning of the words ‘person 
aggrieved’ for the purposes of standing in respect of applications for 
judicial review brought under ss 5-7 of the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘AD(JR) Act’). Broadly, this 
combination of legislative provisions permits applications for judicial 
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80 Australian Law Reform Commission, Beyond the Door-keeper: Standing to Sue for Public 
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review of decisions affecting persons and organisations who are Australian 
citizens, ordinarily resident in Australia, either directly impacted by an 
administrative decision, and who: 
…at any time in the [two] years immediately before the decision, failure 
or conduct, [has] engaged in a series of activities in Australia or an 
external Territory for protection or conservation of, or research into, the 
environment (emphasis added).83 
The inclusion of s 487 extends standing beyond the common law position 
to individuals or civil society organisations who have an interest in the 
environment, whether from a research, environmental protection or 
conservation perspective. Section 487 thereby provides standing to third 
parties who might otherwise have no direct or private interest in the 
proceedings. This approach favours the enforcement model of standing, in 
that rights to commence proceedings are determined not by the applicant’s 
private interest in the decision in question, but rather by their scientific 
expertise and/or background in environmental protection, which are status-
based prerequisites to protect the public interest by seeking enforcement of 
the law.84 
The third party standing provision of s 487 also supported Australia’s 
increasing involvement in international action on environmental protection 
and responding to climate change. For example, Principle 10 of the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) requires, inter alia, 
‘[e]ffective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including 
redress and remedy…’.85 Australia agreed to the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development and has implemented a national strategy on 
ecological sustainable development.86 
One of the misconceptions about third party standing is that it provides a 
licence for anyone to interfere with, or block, development applications. 
This is not the case. The EPBC Act imposes internal limitations on the 
nature of the matters that the Environment Minister may consider in 
providing approval to a project.87 The EPBC Act is directed towards 
protecting ‘matters of national significance’, by requiring ministerial 
approval of specific kinds of projects. Projects which do not trigger the 
EPBC Act are governed by relevant state development control and various 
other legislation. Consequently, the extension of standing under s 487 
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relates to the limited range of usually large-scale development projects that 
are specifically governed by Commonwealth law. 
The standing question in this context is further limited by the restriction on 
the cause of action. Section 487 relates specifically to an extension of 
standing for judicial review, not a blanket extension of any cause of action 
arising at law. While s 487 makes it easier for scientists and environmental 
groups to bring actions for judicial review, that review relates only to those 
matters governed by the EPBC Act, and also confines the parties to the 
remedies available under the AD(JR) Act.88 Broadly, the most common 
order made in these cases is to quash the original decision and order the 
decision be re-made, by the Minister or their delegate, according to law. 
The result in most judicial review cases is that the project is delayed, but 
ultimately goes ahead, after receiving Ministerial approval. 
The fact that the standing provisions are relatively limited to certain kinds 
of projects, and that the ultimate result is usually approval, may well 
explain why the actual use of s 487 is, in fact, relatively low. In the 15 years 
since inception of s 487 there have been over 5500 projects approved under 
the EPBC Act, but only 22 were formally challenged by third parties 
pursuant to s 487.89 Further, of the 33 actions for judicial review of the 
EPBC Act under the AD(JR) Act in that time, only six have required formal 
reconsideration by the Minister.90 A 10-year review of the EPBC Act 
carried out for the Commonwealth by Dr Allan Hawke indicated that s 487 
had only been used conservatively.91 The Hawke Review made no 
recommendations for significant change to s 487. 
Fundamentally, s 487 of the EPBC Act provides a statutory extension of 
the common law standing rules consistent with a wider international 
movement towards the enforcement model which pursues a public interest 
of enhanced executive accountability.  Section 487 was introduced into 
Australian law during the late 1990s, a time in which a Coalition 
government had sufficient political leverage to weaken the private interest 
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foundations of standing law and pursue an enforcement model of standing, 
without significantly alienating key supporters in the business sector. This 
was not, however, a blanket extension, and actually restricts the kinds of 
remedies available to parties. By any measure, the operation of s 487 has 
been modest and minimal – at least in terms of the litigated matters that 
have relied upon it. Doctrinal analysis of standing and s 487 therefore 
suggests there is no significant problem with the operation of the 
enforcement model of standing embodied in s 487 that requires its repeal, 
or even substantial amendment. The recommendations of Dr Hawke’s 
review and academic analysis have also not raised significant reasons for 
repeal of s 487. Whilst doctrinal analysis is a useful starting point for legal 
research into the agenda for repeal of s 487, it clearly misses the wider 
social forces at play that are agitating for its repeal. In the next section, we 
show how the theoretical framework of phronetic legal research, by 
providing a bridge between legal doctrinal and the social context behind its 
formation and change, can illuminate the reasons why s 487 has come 
under threat. 
III PHRONESIS IN ACTION: DISCOURSE, POWER AND THE POLITICS 
OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
If the extended standing provided by s 487 is limited from a doctrinal 
standpoint, and the available evidence suggests that actual use of s 487 is 
minimal, why has standing been problematised as requiring repeal? This is 
a question that might only be answered outside the methods of doctrinal 
research. Doctrinal method, confined to its core, would focus on the 
mechanisms for repeal, any controversies in the common law standing rule 
and mechanics of judicial review, and the hitherto unspoken constitutional 
limitations on the Commonwealth to make laws governing the 
environment. This approach is admirably demonstrated by Groves in his 
recent analysis of the role of the external affairs power, standing and the 
EPBC Act.92 After engaging in a scholarly analysis of largely judicial 
considerations of the standing rule, with reference to s 487, Groves 
concludes that an expanded standing rule is desirable. The article is an 
excellent piece of doctrinal scholarship, and although it recognises, and to 
some extent is critical of the Liberal Government repeal agenda for s 487, 
it does not closely engage with the competing voices driving policy and the 
architecture of law. Similarly, a recent academic debate on the issue 
involving then Attorney-General Brandis and a prominent Australian 
environmental lawyer is largely limited to doctrinal and legal policy 
arguments.93 This analysis does not carefully consider the wider social 
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context which has seen the public interest, enforcement model of standing 
come under significant pressure.94 It is here that the phronetic 
interdisciplinary methodology offers a way forward. 
On 20 August 2015, the Commonwealth Senate referred the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment (Standing) Bill 2015 
(Cth), containing the s 487 repeal provisions, for inquiry and report. The 
original reporting date for the committee was 12 October 2015, however, 
this was extended to the second last sitting day in February 2016.95 
However, this reporting period was shortened and the committee delivered 
its report on 18 November 2015,96 with the government majority on the 
committee supporting repeal of s 487.97 
The following analysis of the policy discourses surrounding efforts to 
repeal s 487 draws on analysis of (i) media statements from the Attorney 
General’s office, (ii) the second reading speech for the repeal Bill for repeal 
of s 487;98 (iii) submissions made by key stakeholders to the Senate 
inquiry, and (iv) the Senate inquiry report. The purpose of our analysis of 
this secondary material is to bring to light the discourses used by key 
stakeholders in public debate over the proposed repeal of s 487. Analysis 
of these discourses provides important insights on the key social drivers of 
the proposed repeal of s 487, including the apparent pressure for retreat 
from the enforcement model of standing to the earlier private interest 
approach of the common law. 
A Second Reading Speech 
The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (Standing) 
Bill 2015 (Cth) was introduced to Parliament on 20 August 2015 by the 
then Minister for the Environment, the Hon Greg Hunt MP. The associated 
second reading speech set out the government’s formal reasons for the 
repeal of s 487.99 The EPBC Act is portrayed in this speech as a model 
piece of environmental legislation, providing certainty for investment and 
environmental management through a rational and efficient system of 
ministerial approval of large development projects. The speech claims that 
since inception, the EPBC Act has seen approval of more than $1 trillion 
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in investment in Australia, reduced transaction costs, and consolidation of 
approvals of major projects at the federal level; described as ‘world-class 
environmental standards’ combined with ‘world-class administration’.100 
However, the speech also claims this system of ‘world class 
administration’ is under threat from the ‘Americanisation’ of 
administrative law. This transformation in administrative law is alleged to 
represent ‘the worst features of the American litigation industry’: mounting 
legal challenges to Ministerial approvals for the primary purpose of 
‘disrupting’ and ‘delaying’ infrastructure projects. ‘Green activists’ are 
acting for political purposes, intentionally increasing ‘investor risk’, for the 
purpose of frustrating and preventing private infrastructure projects.101 The 
speech claims this transformation is part of an orchestrated campaign, 
promoted by a range of local and international activist groups, notably 
Greenpeace, NSW and QLD Environmental Defenders Offices, and the 
Australia Institute.102 The extended standing provisions in s 487 are 
described as a ‘legal loophole’103 that permits instability. The Minister’s 
speech claims the intention behind repealing s 487 is to ‘normalise’ the 
standing provisions of the EPBC Act by reducing the class of persons with 
standing to only those ‘with a genuine and direct interest in a matter’.104 It 
states: 
The EPBC Act standing provisions were never intended to be extended 
and distorted for political purposes as is now occurring with the US style 
litigation campaign to ‘disrupt and delay key projects and infrastructure’ 
and ‘increase investor risk’.105 
The major themes within the second reading speech relate to the 
importance of economic development and capital investment; the 
importance of certainty and security for investors, economic growth and 
public policy; the primacy of reason and rational decision-making; and 
notably an insider/outsider dichotomy of legitimate and illegitimate 
persons and conduct in using s 487, and even the threat presented by a 
‘foreign’ set of litigation practices that have been ‘imported’ from the 
United States with perverse affect. The explicit purpose of the amendment 
to repeal s 487 was the removal of a device from the EPBC Act that 
permitted ‘outsiders’, being activist litigants, from using the courts as a 
vehicle to challenge private economic interests. 
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B Environment and Communications Legislation Committee Report 
As part of the inquiry into the repeal Bill, conducted by the Environment 
and Communications Legislation Committee, public submissions were 
invited. There were 292 written submissions made, and over 21 000 form 
letters.106 Public hearings were initially tabled, but later cancelled. The 
Committee instead decided to report based on the written submissions.107 
The report set out the arguments in favour and against the repeal. The report 
split 3:3 down party lines,108 and therefore cannot be characterised as a 
unanimous position. The case for repeal of s 487 involved five elements: 
(i) the detrimental effect to business certainty; (ii) the extensive 
involvement of community groups in consultation; (iii) the availability of 
alternative review processes through administrative review; (iv) the 
absence of measurable outcomes through the use of s 487; and (v) the 
continuity of environmental protections under the EPBC Act.109 The case 
for retention of s 487 involved seven elements: (i) limited evidence of 
vexatious or frivolous litigation; (ii) the fact that repeal would actually 
complicate litigation, as it would instead require interlocutory judicial 
determination of standing; (iii) that fact that repeal would reduce access to 
justice as a public good; (iv) the fact that repeal would challenge the rule 
of law by reducing scrutiny of administrative decisions; (v) consensus 
views on standing which favoured the expansion, rather than reduction, of 
standing provisions; (vi) the fact that the repeal purported to have 
retrospective application; and (vii) the fact that the repeal challenged 
Australia’s international obligations.110 
The ‘committee view’ (i.e. that of the three government Senators), 
recommended the Bill repealing s 487 be passed. The opposition Australian 
Labor Party and the Greens opposed the repeal Bill. Notably, Senator 
Larissa Waters (Greens) made nine recommendations intended to expand 
the protections for standing on environmental grounds, noting that ‘of the 
5500 projects referred for assessment under the EPBC… only 22 projects 
were subject to legal challenge, and only two projects have ever been 
stopped by legal challenges.’111 
It is also worth noting that the repeal Bill was the subject of two concurrent 
Senate Committee evaluations, first by the Scrutiny of Bills Committee, 
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and then by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights. Both 
Committees raised objections with the Bill, and asked for comment from 
the Minister for the Environment. The Scrutiny of Bills Committee 
observed that standing in environmental cases was an area of particular 
public importance, because it raises ‘matters of general rather than 
individual concern’.112 In addition, ‘restrictive standing rules may mean 
that decisions relating to environmental regulation are, in practice, beyond 
effective judicial review’.113 This combination of issues had, in the 
Scrutiny of Bills Committee’s view, constitutional implications, as reduced 
standing rules have the capacity to prevent judicial scrutiny of 
administrative decisions (thereby preventing the courts from ensuring the 
legality of decisions made by Commonwealth ministers), and for 
increasing the complexity of litigation as courts would be required to assess 
standing on common law grounds as a threshold issue. Accordingly, the 
Scrutiny of Bills Committee sought advice from the Minister on the 
justification for the repeal. Reasons were not provided, other than a 
statement that the purpose of the repeal was to bring the standing rules ‘into 
line with the standard arrangements’, and reference to an ‘emerging risk of 
the extended standing provisions being used to deliberately disrupt and 
delay key projects’.114 
In addition, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights identified 
the proposed repeal as being at odds with art 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which declares a right 
to health and a healthy environment.115 This Committee was also critical 
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of the ‘statement of human rights compatibility’ annexed to the Bill,116 
noting that the annexure failed to properly address international and 
domestic human rights implications. The Committee subsequently 
requested and received particulars from the Minister. The letter presented 
the Minister’s opinion that ‘the removal of the extended standing 
provisions [did] not engage the right to health in art 12 of the International 
Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, because the Bill did 
not prevent those with a ‘legitimate objective’ from bringing judicial 
review action117. Nor did the Bill affect the environmental protections 
available under the Act, which preserved the environment.118 In other 
words, the Minister’s response was to reinforce the distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate persons who might challenge executive 
decisions on environmental matters. 
C Themes in Public Submissions 
The submissions to the Senate Committee were sharply divided between 
those parties in favour of repeal, and those against it. The voices in favour 
of repeal that had the greatest impact were the Business Council of 
Australia,119 the Minerals Council of Australia,120 and Ports Australia.121 
The impact of these three submissions on the Senate committee findings 
appears considerable and disproportionate, given the overwhelming 
majority of submissions favoured retaining s 487. This is demonstrable in 
the repeated use of material from those submissions in the inquiry’s report, 
and the essential endorsement of the views within these submissions by the 
Senate Committee. The voices in favour of retaining extended standing 
were drawn from a diverse array of actors, but are principally identifiable 
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as environmentalists, legal professionals/academics, and concerned 
citizens. These submissions were influential in the dissenting reports. In 
analysing the values and the unspoken or implied themes within the 
submissions, a series of themes emerge, as identified in the following table: 
 
Interest group Basic position Reasons 
Environmental Opposes repeal Individuals and communities have a right 
to a healthy environment, and the right to 
challenge government decisions affecting 
them. 
 
Repeal will increase litigation costs and 
complexity, and erode confidence in 
government decision making. 
 
Repeal reduces the capacity of the public 
to scrutinise development applications 
and government decision making. 
 
There is no evidence that third party 
standing rules have been abused or out of 
control. 
 
The potential environmental problems are 
devastating. 
Farming Opposes repeal Repeal restricts the ability of farmers and 
the farming industry to oppose 
developments that affect collective or 
community farming interests. 
 
Large scale open-cut mining in certain 
areas affects water quality, availability 
and fertility. 
Indigenous Opposes repeal Section 487 facilitates capacity of the 
public to protect matters of national 
significance. 
 
Connection with land is cultural. Section 
487 allows for challenge in cases where 
there is no direct physical link to the 
development, but otherwise a historical 
and cultural connection. 
 
Legal  Opposes repeal Section 487 enables public accountability 
and scrutiny of the actions of the executive 
arm of government. 
 
Repeal of s 487 will not eliminate third 
party challenge. It will complicate 
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standing proceedings in courts as parties 
litigate standing, even before 
concentrating on the core issue. 
 
The courts possess a range of powers to 
prevent vexatious or abuse of process. 
Mining Supports repeal Section 487 is a ‘loophole’ that allows 
activists to launch vexatious litigation for 
the purpose of creating investment risk. 
 
Delayed decisions have negative 
economic consequences. 
Table 1: Summary of submissions to overview of the submissions of interest 
groups prepared as a part of the Parliamentary Bills Digest for the repeal Bill.122 
Like most areas of public policy, the arguments that emerge out of a 
multitude of voices are complex and interwoven. However, what is clear is 
that the majority of submissions were opposed to repeal of s 487. We 
suggest that the complexity of these submissions might be usefully viewed 
as crystallising around three key discourses of ‘economic primacy’, 
‘environmental harm’ and ‘government accountability’. 
1 The ‘Economic Primacy’ Discourse 
The case for repeal is dominated by economic and capital investment 
values and interests. Given the nature of the projects governed by the EPBC 
Act, the economic weight of these interests is substantial. The Business 
Council of Australia, for example, claims that the value of ‘committed 
projects’ in Australia in 2015 exceeded $220 billion.123 It claims that delays 
to major projects from ‘legal obstruction’ present a direct threat to future 
investment and profits. The Business Council, relying on Productivity 
Commission analysis, suggests that a one-year delay in a natural gas 
project, for example, could involve costs to investors of up to $2 billion.124 
Similarly, the Minerals Council of Australia claims (again, relying on the 
Productivity Commission) that ‘unnecessary delays can add costs of $46 
million per month to a major green fields mining project.’125 These costs, 
it is argues, constitute an unacceptable risk to investment and 
‘sovereignty’, with consequences for employment and infrastructure 
investment. When the total number of approvals and the number of judicial 
review actions arising under s 487 are considered, the number of projects 
actually affected seems insignificant. However, for any single major 
project, the reality of delay becomes substantial to those involved, and their 
associated investors. Actual and potential losses caused by delay (direct 
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and indirect) thus become far more important than an aggregate figure 
would otherwise suggest. 
Delays of this kind, and the uncertainty they create, give rise to a climate 
where a single episode of legal challenge imports significant financial risk, 
essentially tied to investment decisions. But of equal importance to the 
financial aspect of economic reasoning is the challenge that s 487 provides 
to the ability of economic actors to make investment decisions and assert 
economic autonomy. The notion of ‘sovereign risk’, or risk to the profits 
of overseas investors from government decision making, is an explicit 
element of this discourse. This position is curious, given that the empirical 
evidence on approvals demonstrates that most proposals that trigger 
application of the EPBC Act are ultimately approved. 
The economic primacy discourse clearly is consistent with a return to a 
private interest model of standing, which it considers more amenable to 
restricting the class of potential challengers. This private interest model is 
thought to better facilitate development projects and the protection of 
economic growth, corporate profits and future investment. Whilst the 
alignment of business lobbyists (such as the Business Council of Australia 
and the Minerals Council of Australia) with private interests and protecting 
corporate profits is unsurprising, the blind spot in this discourse appears to 
be that a return of standing to the private interest position (i.e. the position 
in ACF) may reduce the costs and delay of standing disputes. 
 
2 The ‘Environmental Harm’ Discourse 
As one would expect in cases involving environmental dissent, the case for 
retention of s 487 is firmly linked to an overarching concern for protection 
of the environment. Indeed, concern regarding the environmental impact 
of the Carmichael mine is an overwhelming frequently-held position, not 
only in the detailed submissions presented to the Senate inquiry, but 
particularly in the large number of letters sent to the inquiry.126 It would be 
an error, however, to assume that the ‘environmental harm’ discourse has 
a single dimension. Indeed, there are multiple aspects of this discourse. 
Indigenous groups, for example, locate environmental issues to local 
conceptions of land, place and culture – as well as wider concerns for the 
longevity of species of flora and fauna.127 Many submissions are narrower 
in focus, but necessarily linked to environmental issues under the umbrella 
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of matters of ‘national significance’.128 In addition to what might be 
classified as traditional concerns about the protection of local biodiversity, 
however, numerous complex submissions focus on the global issue of the 
impact of fossil fuel extraction from the mine and its eventual consumption 
as a major contributor to anthropogenic climate change.129 These 
submissions are rarely singular in their composition, articulating  a mixture 
of local, regional and global environmental concerns. They overlap with an 
equally forceful claim for the right to challenge government decisions to 
protect the public interest in these matters. 
The environmental harm discourse clearly seeks to maintain the status quo 
of the enforcement model of standing embodied in s 487 of the EPBC Act. 
The various environmental and indigenous interests articulating this 
discourse are concerned to maintain expertise-based status (i.e. expertise 
in environmental research or advocacy) as the key indicia of the right to 
bring a judicial review action under the EPBC Act. The environmental 
harm discourse articulates the importance of ‘the public’ in that specific 
expertise-based plaintiffs are tasked with the capacity to pursue the public 
interest of protecting and conserving the natural environment for all 
citizens. It is also unsurprising that the environmental harm discourse is 
emanating from an alignment of social actors less concerned with capital 
accumulation and more embodied in place-based environmental and/or 
heritage protection. 
3 The ‘Government Accountability’ Discourse 
These submissions primarily emphasise the importance of judicial review 
as a major public law device for ensuring the accountability of executive 
decisions and action. The ability of actors (citizens and NGOs) to hold the 
executive to account through judicial review is described as a fundamental 
‘democratic right’ and a clear manifestation of the rule of law in a 
contemporary liberal democracy. Indeed, some submissions assert that this 
‘democratic right’ performs an important anti-corruption function,130 plays 
a key role in building and maintaining confidence in planning decisions,131 
and allows public organisations to properly scrutinise and protect matters 
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of public interest.132 These discourses contain an important, but essentially 
implied, power dynamic. That dynamic is that in the absence of direct 
action against government and corporations (which is routinely unlawful), 
standing provisions provide a vehicle through which powerful interest 
groups can be held to account. This accountability is not just about ensuring 
the integrity of decision-making. It is also the modern expression of liberal 
dissent transformed into a legal form. The ability for individuals and 
communities to change and shape the past, present and future, is a major 
and important underlying theme of the accountability discourse. Not only 
does the law play a major role in political economy, it also plays a major 
role in the ability of individuals to assert control over their futures. 
Interestingly, this public accountability argument is not openly challenged 
in the submissions of those voices sympathetic to repeal. This is not 
surprising, since the ability of corporate interests to challenge government 
decisions is an equally, if not vociferously, defended right, and central to 
liberal political ideology.  However, there is a clear bifurcation of views 
from the ‘repealers’. Those views distinguish between a broad democratic 
right to challenge executive decisions, where standing is offered to parties 
with a link to the issue being decided, and a narrow view that only those 
with a ‘legitimate’ (i.e. a ‘direct’ interest in the decision) have a right to 
bring a judicial review challenge. This position necessarily rejects the 
claim that a ‘third party’ has any right to intervene. This argument relies 
on a rhetorical position that ‘third party’ intervention is not only costly, but 
part of an orchestrated strategy of economic ‘disruption’ or ‘lawfare’. Here 
we find submissions that often present evidence that directly challenges the 
argument that s 487 is being abused. Indeed, the empirical evidence clearly 
establishes that judicial review actions under s 487 are, on the whole, 
unsuccessful.133 However, the argument in favour of repeal also suggests 
that standing provisions do not actually result in positive environmental 
outcomes, tend to escalate costs, and fundamentally succeed in delaying 
projects in such a way as to discourage capital investment.134 Ports 
Australia supports repeal, but also concludes that it is likely that standing 
is well entrenched in Australian common law. Repeal of s 487 is therefore 
likely to result in an increase in more complex and costly litigation, and be 
counterproductive.135 While the ‘right’ to challenge government decisions 
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is commonly asserted or recognised by all parties, what differs is the scope 
of who should possess that right. 
The government accountability discourse represents an alignment of public 
lawyers, environmental groups and state government regulators concerned 
with protection and expansion of the enforcement model of standing as a 
bulwark against unlawful executive decision making. The key concern is 
not with the substantive value of environmental protection per se, but rather 
protection of rule of law in holding executive government to account. 
Interestingly, some of submissions to the Senate inquiry also display 
elements of a third model of standing identified by Edgar as one of ‘public 
participation’.136 Edgar explains this model of standing, which has its roots 
in United States jurisprudence, is designed ‘to ensure fair representation of 
a wide range of interested persons and groups in administrative decision- 
making processes’137. This is a significantly wider ambit for standing that 
has not yet been supported in Australian case law, yet still represents an 
important further articulation of the possibility of standing as means for 
expansion of democratic political process. The business lobby groups are 
clearly on uneasy ground in responding to the government accountability 
discourse. On the one hand, business lobby groups are usually strong 
supporters of vigilant checks upon government power. On the other hand, 
business lobby groups are here supporting a winding back of the rights of 
citizens to challenge government power. This unease is sought to be 
navigated by the distinction these groups make between ‘legitimate’ and 
‘illegitimate’ purposes for which checks on government power might be 
exercised. However, the difficult tension between upholding and eroding 
liberal values still remains in these submissions. 
IV DISCUSSION 
The repeal Bill remains lapsed and has not yet been tabled in this term of 
Parliament. However, as observed above,138 it played an important role in 
anchoring economic primacy in Australian public discourse and its use of 
the pejorative term of ‘lawfare’. The overall aim of the repeal Bill appeared 
to be one concerned with restricting the capacities of environmental groups 
to challenge large-scale development projects through controlling the 
threshold standing issue. It is hard not to conclude that the repeal agenda 
for s 487 forms part of a larger agenda aimed at limiting, or preventing, the 
capacity of environmental groups to challenge development by removing 
statutory standing and the financial resources needed for litigation. The 
‘economic primary’ discourse supporting repeal of s 487 has been met by 
well-organised and powerfully articulated ‘environmental protection’ and 
‘accountability of government’ discourses. Even the corporate and 
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government interests in favour of repeal have found it difficult to counter 
the weight of legal and public articulation of the ‘government 
accountability’ discourse. It is decidedly awkward for a purportedly liberal 
government to be advocating discourses that have the rather illiberal 
character of potentially reducing accountability of government decision 
making. 
To be fair, it is important to recognise that in the context of major projects, 
even a single challenge in the courts can result in substantial costs, not only 
in terms of the costs associated with legal proceedings, but also opportunity 
costs and investment uncertainty. In this context it is easy to understand 
why some business interests advocate for removal of the mechanism that 
allows for legal challenge in that forum. The kind of capital necessary for 
projects of this kind is significant; it is capital that can easily be reallocated 
to alternative options. It is no surprise advocates are sensitive to third party 
standing. In that context, the statistics associated with the restrained use of 
s 487 means little, when individual cases threaten, or seem to threaten, 
multi-billion-dollar investments that have the potential to generate 
significant regional economic benefits. However, legal policy decisions, 
made through a process of contestation between the three discourses 
described above, will often involve both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Individual 
actors can often point to the ‘unfairness’ of being a ‘loser’ from a particular 
legal policy decision. However, the more interesting aspect of the 
discursive approach to analysis is to demonstrate how this contestation 
between discourses provides an ongoing process of trade-offs and 
accommodations between competing legal policy positions. 
On the assumption that both Habermas139 and Haines140 are correct, it 
seems that the debate concerning s 487 represents an enduring problem in 
contemporary democratic governance: the effect of risk consciousness. 
Habermas and Haines both argue that democratic governments are 
particularly vulnerable to risk as a conceptual and pragmatic aspect of 
government. The financial and social pressures associated with creating 
‘jobs and growth’ are directly linked with an associated political economy. 
Not only does financial investment play a role in the creation of 
employment, it also widens the tax-base. In areas of low employment, 
large-scale capital investment tends to increase local economic activity. 
This not only tends to improve local living standards, it also has a direct 
link to the re-election prospects of politicians. The overarching political 
interest in that context is the retention of government, achieved by 
improving constituents’ standard of living. Political parties of whatever 
denomination are faced with a major dilemma in the context of fossil fuels. 
On the one hand, they have a vested interest in the retention of government 
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and are naturally interested in the improved standard of living of their 
electorates. On the other hand, they are under increasing pressure to 
facilitate investment in modes of lower carbon energy production due to 
the problem of climate change. 
To return to the core questions of phronetic method, let us consider the 
following. Where are we going with third party standing? The basic answer 
is the agenda to repeal third party standing is part of federal government 
policy, but is currently stalled. Legally, the repeal amendment would need 
to be tabled again within the life of the current Parliament, and be passed 
by both houses of Parliament, to become valid law. In this respect, the 
politics of the repeal Bill keep the repeal agenda alive as ‘nascent’ law; that 
is, as a statement of potentiality, rather than a matter of legal doctrine. 
Pragmatically, there would need to be the numbers in both houses. As the 
present government does not have the numbers in the Senate needed to pass 
the law, it would need to rely on support from unaligned Senators to pass 
the repeal Bill. Given the popularity of the perceived right to standing, it 
seems unlikely the law would pass given the political backlash likely to 
emerge in the various electorates. In this respect, the repeal forms a part of 
the contested ground of discourse and power between the various actors. 
Who gains, and who loses, by which mechanisms of power? Our analysis 
shows that the business lobbies, despite a weak doctrinal position and 
lacking strong empirical evidence of lost development, were able to 
marshal enough discursive power through a supportive federal government 
and the Senate committee process to significantly influence the majority 
report which found in favour of repeal of s 487. However, this discursive 
power is limited, and has not (yet) overcome the opposing ‘environmental 
protection’ and ‘government accountability’ discourses sufficiently to 
allow passage of the repeal Bill. The discursive coalition built around the 
economic primacy discourse (comprising the Business Council of 
Australia, the Mining Council of Australia, Ports Australia and the federal 
government) has been unable to overcome the discursive coalition of actors 
(environmental groups, public lawyers, academic lawyers) that have 
coalesced around environmental protection and government accountability 
discourses. This case study illustrates the importance of viewing highly 
contested legal reform through the lens of competing discursive coalitions 
of social actors. Power here is not primarily material or financial, but 
discursive, in the sense of arguing and contesting ideas within the public 
sphere.141 
Third party standing continues to operate as a vehicle of dissent. Arguably, 
the current ‘loser’ in this scenario is anyone frustrated by litigation seeking 
judicial review. The power manifested in this context is mobilised through 
the courts; it is the complex reification of dissent, protest and values 
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164    The University of Tasmania Law Review Vol 37 No 2 2018 
enlivened through the text of law to become the orchestrated conflict within 
the process of litigation and courtroom drama. But loss has to be 
understood as more than one party not achieving a goal; loss can also be 
understood as the potential economic and financial benefits that can flow 
from large-scale projects. The ‘gain’ is similarly complex. Gain can be 
linked to the person or community that succeeds in their course of action; 
in the prevention of the losses flowing from destruction of the environment 
and species, and even from preventing catastrophic climate change. 
Equally, the ‘gain’ is the recognition of the right, in law, for concerned 
citizens to take their case before a court for judicial review. Even in cases 
where parties are not successful in the action itself, success may come from 
the scrutiny and controls placed over developments. A dialectic operates in 
conflict, such that there can be a reconciliation of opposites, with 
something new emerging from it. A development may still proceed, but 
with sufficient controls in place that immediate environmental losses are 
minimised, or rectification undertaken. 
Is repeal desirable? Ultimately, answering this question inevitably entails 
a value judgment. Like the discourses around repeal, there will be a variety 
of answers. When we consider the values at play around repeal, it is 
tempting to polarise the repeal debate as a contest between greed and 
altruism. But to do so would be simplistic. A great deal of public benefit 
can arise out of capital investment, even when there are (private) profits 
being made. Conversely, the absence of economic development can ensure 
the impoverishment of communities, even when the environment is 
otherwise pristine. There appears to be an emerging set of legal principles 
in international law concerned with ‘non-regression’ and ‘progression’. 
The former is the principle that once a human right has been recognised, it 
should not be eroded. The latter is the principle that state actors work 
towards developing and supporting the various articles agreed to by parties 
to the agreement.142 Accordingly, repeal of standing provisions is notably 
regressive, and likely an emergent contravention of international human 
rights norms. What is desirable, in our view, is a retention of the ability of 
communities and individuals to challenge decisions affecting rights, 
                                                         
142 Gaps in International Environmental Law and Environment-Related Instruments: 
Towards a Global Pact for the Environment: Report of the Secretary-General, UN GAOR, 
73rd sess, Agenda Item 14, UN Doc A/73/419 (30 November 2018) [22]. ‘The principle of 
non-regression is relatively new to the field of environmental law, while its underlying idea 
of disallowing backtracking is well understood in systems that protect human rights and in 
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improvement of environmental legislation, including by increasing the level of protection, 
on the basis of the most recent scientific knowledge. The Paris Agreement is explicit in this 
regard and provides, in article 4, paragraph 3, that each successive nationally determined 
contribution “will represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally 
determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition”.’ 
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liberties and interests in the courts. People must have the capacity to shape 
and mobilise a dignified future. In that respect, we do not consider it 
desirable to repeal s 487. To do so would likely result, in our opinion, in 
one of two things. Either it would mean that litigation becomes more 
complex, or it would create a climate where even more direct action is 
contemplated or certain. There are, in effect, consequences for the stability 
of government and the accountability of decision makers evident in the 
absence of third party standing provisions. It is a net public good for 
individuals, groups and communities beyond the immediate nexus of 
development to have the capacity to challenge decisions. We agree with 
the concluding comments of Power and Tomaras: 
There is a risk that, if s 487 is repealed, the resulting uncertainty could 
have the perverse consequence of causing more delays and costs to 
projects as third parties will first need to establish standing before the 
substantive issue can be considered by the court…[and] s 487 serves as a 
mechanism to help ensure decision-makers lawfully comply with 
legislative procedures. As such, its proposed repeal raises questions about 
accountable and responsible government.143 
What, then, should be done? This is another value-laden question, that 
requires vision. At one level, simply leaving s 487 in place will be regarded 
as problematic by those most interested in capital investment. For capital 
accumulation, there is nothing quite like being able to make decisions and 
executing them uninhibited; but that kind of sovereign power has rarely 
existed, and where it has the results have always been problematic. The 
rule of law has evolved out of the very real experiences of conflict that 
tends to arise out of state attempts to do whatever is desired, and the 
perverse (i.e. unequal) distribution of wealth and power that tend to go with 
this. 
Ultimately, this is a complex political question, but its resolution will 
undoubtedly involve ensuring that the interests of those affected by 
development control decisions are genuinely considered. And in the 
context of climate change, it will also require a shift in energy systems 
away from reliance on combustion of fossil fuels. There is no reason why 
capital investment cannot be shifted into new economies, technologies and 
projects that may, in the end, provide a point of consensus for most 
concerned, and ensure that anthropogenic climate change does not, in the 
end, make those decisions for all of us. Those decisions would of course 
be without repeal or review. 
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V CONCLUSION 
Simply stated, doctrinal legal scholarship cannot adequately explain the 
reform agenda for removing third party standing rules under the EPBC Act. 
The reason for this is twofold. The first relates to the epistemological 
foundations of law as a discipline. The second is because the topic itself 
exists at the intersection of law and political economy. With the repeal 
agenda, we see an example of the reform of law being mobilised as an 
instrument of power. Indeed, we contend that the ultimate explanation for 
the push for repeal of s 487 is a highly complex one, resting at the junctions 
of local, regional, national and international politics. In that context, there 
will be competing versions of truth. For some, the repeal of s 487 simply 
represents an attempt by the fossil fuel industry and its associated allies to 
decisively deal with a threat to economic interests. For others, the repeal 
represents an attempt to balance competing social, political and economic 
interests in ways that seek to address all concerns. 
By using phronetic legal inquiry, we conclude that the reason the agenda 
for repeal of s 487 defies doctrinal legal logics is because the debate exists 
outside of doctrinal law. It is a discursive contest between competing 
coalitions of societal actors, operating at the intersection of political 
economy. Business, environmental, public law and indigenous groups seek 
to exercise discursive power, through membership of these discourse 
coalitions, to shape understanding of the need (or not) for law reform. We 
have seen this discursive contestation in this case centring on the model 
(i.e. private interest or enforcement) which should shape public law on 
standing. Legal rules here are simply the instrument of this discursive 
contestation. But this is not to say that legal analysis makes little 
contribution to the debate. The fact that the standing rules, public insistence 
and legal systems are willing to hold government decision making to 
account, regardless of the presence of s 487, is of fundamental importance. 
Consistent with Flyvbjerg’s hypothesis that values are fundamentally 
ingrained in power contests, we agree that the discursive contestation over 
repeal of s 487 is very much alive with the contestation of values. These 
discourses are nascent expressions of a struggle for power, as much as law. 
And because values are at the heart of the debate, it is almost certain that 
even in the absence of s 487, this kind of environmental debate will be the 
inevitable trigger of alternative forms of struggle – both inside and outside 
the courtroom.  
Understanding this link between law and power is, we suggest, of 
fundamental importance, and justification for the retention of s 487. The 
political economy of s 487, we suggest, raises questions of fundamental 
importance as to the role and function of law in democracies. And those 
questions are linked not only to the use of law as an instrument to provide 
economic benefits and security, but also to provide a vehicle whereby 
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conflict can be properly channelled, adjudicated and managed. In so doing, 
s 487 actually plays a significant role in maintaining confidence in our 
system of law and government. That, we suggest, is grounds alone for 
retaining it. As observed by the Australian Panel of Experts on 
Environmental Law, the capacity for legal challenge plays a central role in 
finding the balance between economic, social, Indigenous and 
environmental needs and interests, and in so doing functions to give 
practical effect to being trustees for the environment for future generations. 
Accountability, integrity and explicit concern for the proper management 
of the environment are fundamental to a healthy democracy.144 
In this case study we have demonstrated how the phronetic methodology 
can expand our understanding of law, in multiple ways. First, the analysis 
identifies the natural limits of purely doctrinal approaches to legal analysis. 
Second, the case study opens a window into the complex intersections that 
shape and determine the substance of law, including both its operative and 
principled core. Third, we suggest the case study operates as an example 
of the ways in which a phronetic approach can be utilised as a methodology 
in socio-legal analysis. In other words, this technique is not only useful in 
terms of expanding the pragmatic and theoretical aspects of its topic; it is 
also useful in identifying important intersections between law and other 
disciplines and practices. For example, in this case there is a rich field 
identified as operating at the junction between law and politics. We would 
suggest that further study can be undertaken exploring the discursive and 
political aspects of major resource projects and public dissent. In addition, 
we would suggest legal phronesis provides a useful model for articulating 
a methodology offering assistance to scholars contemplating multi-
disciplinary research on legal reform. 
There are, of course, limitations in this work. The phronetic model merges 
the boundaries between a number of disciplines, notably law and politics. 
It also makes a series of assumptions about the nature of legal epistemology 
that is open to debate. On the one hand a narrow view can be taken, similar 
to the European/Kelsen tradition that sees law sharply linked to the 
interpretation and characterisation of legislation and cases.145 On the other 
hand, legal scholarship, particularly in the sociolegal/realist tradition, is 
much broader in perspective, situating law firmly within a complex web of 
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social, economic and political themes.146 It is important, therefore, to 
assume either (i) that doctrinal legal scholarship is somehow defective 
(which clearly it is not), or (ii) that phronetic method promises answers that 
are not otherwise open to traditional legal research. This is a valid and 
important debate that is a defining feature of the sociology of law, that we 
cannot address here. We are mindful of the danger in treating law too 
narrowly. The approach presented here aims to isolate the rule structures 
at the outset, with a view of re-immersion in context. 
In the end, while we have used the Adani Carmichael coal mine as an entry 
point into the agenda for repeal of s 487, we suggest that the issues, 
discourses, power and political economies that example has generated are 
likely to be present in many, if not all, large-scale mining projects. To be 
clear, we are not ‘anti-mining’ as such. As scholars, we necessarily have 
our own views on this, which we feel are appropriately kept personal in 
this forum. We recognise the social and economic benefits that might be 
had from mining, but equally, there are voices in this debate that need to 
be heard – and those voices rightly include third party challengers, as well 
as those who advocate for investment in new forms of energy in ways that 
will not contribute to catastrophic climate change.  
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